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7 
The Good That Lawyers Do 
Kathleen M. Sullivan* 
It is a delight to be at Washington University School of Law in a 
beautiful new building and to have an introduction from Dean Joel 
Seligman. I want to thank Dean Seligman for all the help, guidance, 
and wonderful advice he has given me; I will continue to call on him 
as I get into my fourth week and beyond as Dean at Stanford Law 
School. 
My topic is the good that lawyers do. This essay provides a set of 
arguments for law students who are coming into this noble  calling, 
this important profession. The essay offers a kind of booster shot, 
innoculation, or vaccination against every relative, classmate from 
college, or taxi driver who gives you a hard time about being a 
lawyer. 
Where does this skepticism about lawyers come from? It is quite 
ancient. Lawyer jokes and bashing are such an ancient practice that 
complete books exist on the typology of lawyer jokes since the 
Middle Ages. In Shakespeare’s Henry VI, Part II1 the character Dick, 
contemplating a new regime, says: “[T]he first we do, let’s kill all the 
lawyers.”2 The practice of lawyer bashing runs from Shakespeare to 
the present. For example, recently the New Yorker, which regularly 
contains lawyer cartoons, showed a picture of a God-like figure, up 
high on a cloud surrounded by a number of men and women wearing 
suits and casting lightning bolts down toward earth, with God saying: 
“I used to do it myself but now I have my lawyers do it.” That is the 
joke side of the attack on lawyers. 
 
 * Dean and Richard E. Lang Professor and Stanley Morrison Professor, Stanford Law 
School. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1981. The following Article is based on a presentation by 
Dean Sullivan in the Public Interest Law Speaker Series at Washington University School of 
Law on September 15, 1999. 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE , T HE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH (Michael 
Hattaway ed., Cambridge University Press, 1991) (n.d.). 
 2. Id. at act 4, sc.2, l.83-84. 
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Some attacks on lawyers are more serious. Former Vice-President 
Dan Quayle recently gave a speech in San Francisco, in which he 
blamed a wide range of current problems on “cultural decline.”3 By 
cultural decline he meant parents’ loss of authority over their children 
and schools’ loss of authority over their students. This time Quayle 
blamed cultural decline not on Murphy Brown,4 but rather on the 
“legal aristocracy,”5 which he defined as those lawyers who bring 
lawsuits for civil rights on behalf of children and other individuals in 
our society.6  
These kinds of skeptical accounts, whether joking or serious, 
about the good that lawyers do warrant a serious response. This essay 
responds to these popular versions of professional slander, or, at 
least, unfortunate myopia, about the good that lawyers do. This 
essay’s title refers to that good in two different senses. The good has 
at least two kinds of meaning in liberal political theory and in the 
American legal tradition. Sometimes, when one talks about the good, 
one means the good in the sense of social welfare, social product, or 
social utility. This sense of the good comes from utilitarian and 
classical economic traditions.7 One also uses the term good to mean 
virtue, beneficence, or benevolence; doing things for reasons other 
than mere will, gratification, or self-interest. This use of the term 
connotes a moral sense arising from the Kantian8 or deontological 
tradition, and, ultimately, from Aristotle.9 This essay uses the term 
good in both senses; it addresses the good as social product, and then 
as social virtue.  
 
 3. Carla Marinucci, This Time in S.F. Quayle Blames the Lawyers; But His Speech Lacks 
Punch of Murphy Brown , S.F. CHRON., May 20, 1999, at A1. 
 4. On May 19, 1992, then Vice-President Dan Quayle delivered a speech to the 
Commonwealth Club in California where he criticized Hollywood’s “cultural elite” and what he 
called the popular sitcom’s “glamorizing” of single motherhood and “mocking” the importance 
of fathers because the main character on the show, a career woman, chose to have a child 
without the involvement of a father. Vice-President Dan Quayle, Address at the Commonwealth 
Club of California (May 19, 1992), reprinted in After the Riots; Excerpts from Vice President’s 
Speech on Cities and Poverty, N.Y. T IMES, May 20, 1992, at A20. 
 5. Marinucci, supra  note 3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (1863). 
 8. IMMANUAL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor 
trans. & ed., Cambridge University Press 1997) (1788).  
 9. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS (Carlton House 1900) (n.d.). 
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I. GOOD AS SOCIAL PRODUCT 
It is often asked: “Does society really need another lawyer?” 
Sometime during the year 2000 the United States likely met the 
magic benchmark of having one million lawyers. This means that the 
nation shifted from one lawyer for every 627 people in 1960 to one 
lawyer for every 260 as of the year 2000. Many people look at the 
growth rate and say, “Why do we need so many lawyers?” and “Why 
do we need lawyers increasing at such a rapid rate?” They claim that 
other countries do not have so many lawyers per capita. One must 
look at that claim, however, with skepticism.  
Frequently, when people notice the small number of lawyers in 
other countries they ignore the fact that people in those countries 
serve the same role that lawyers serve in the United States, but are 
not denominated as lawyers. In Japan for example, it is commonly 
said that there is only one lawyer for every 10,000 residents of 
Japanese society. This statistic, however, uses the term lawyer to 
refer to members of the bengoshi, the group that corresponds to 
British barristers and represents people at the formal judicial bar. But 
Japan, like many developed nations other than the United States, fills 
its government bureaucracies, civil service ranks, and dispute 
resolution centers with many more people than these statistics 
account for; Japan simply does not classify these individuals as 
lawyers. In the United States the term lawyer does not describe 
merely one who works at the private bar; lawyers fill many positions 
in public affairs and the civil services. Other countries do not classify 
people who fulfill these roles as lawyers. Thus, statistics from other 
countries underreport the actual number of people performing the 
lawyer function. The United States thus does not have more lawyers 
so much as it has more versatile lawyers who do more things. 
What do lawyers in the United States do? American lawyers are 
not just litigators. Only about 10% to 12% of American lawyers 
describe themselves as litigators; that is, as people who primarily 
engage in courtroom advocacy of the kind that television and other 
parts of popular culture heavily represent as the work that lawyers do. 
In television, trial work is misrepresented. The trials are as short as 
the skirt lengths, there is no visible evidence of the time it takes to do 
legal research, and a closing argument takes under thirty seconds. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Popular culture focuses on trial law to the exclusion of all the other 
things that lawyers do, contributing to misconceptions about lawyers. 
The portrait of lawyers as courtroom gladiators fails to capture the 
way most lawyers actually work. 
In fact, American lawyers do a wide range of work that Dean 
Robert Clark of Harvard Law School has aptly called “normative 
ordering.”10 It is a lawyer’s job, taking the profession as a whole, to 
create, find, interpret, adapt, apply, and enforce rules and principles 
that structure human relationships.  
Why do we need normative orderers, or specialists who create, 
interpret, apply, and enforce rules and principles that enable people to 
work together? The answer, if it does not come from human nature 
since time immemorial, certainly comes from features of American 
life with which everyone is familiar. In American life, since at least 
the Constitution’s framing, conflict among factions and groups in our 
society is inevitable. James Madison, writing in The Federalist 
Papers, Number Ten, stated that “divisions” among people, which he 
famously referred to as “factions,” derive from human nature.11 
Madison delineated two types of factions: (1) factions of passion that 
divide people by their deepest principles, religious beliefs, and 
morals, and (2) factions of interest that divide people according to 
their line of work, wealth, and expectations in society. According to 
Madison, factions are “sown into the nature of man.”12 
The notion that society needs normative ordering simply 
recognizes the irreducible fact that in human society conflict arises 
among groups organized in overlapping ways by passion and interest. 
Society needs to find ways to coordinate people’s activities across 
that conflict. 
Lawyers create normative order in a great many ways beyond the 
passage of formal laws and regulations. One might believe that 
normative order refers simply to statutes and regulations. True, 
statutes and regulations are one form of normative order, but lawyers 
also provide normative order through the rules and procedures they 
 
 10. Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 275, 281 (1992). 
 11. T HE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at  57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 12. Id. at 58. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/3
p  7 Sullivan.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  The Good That Lawyers Do 11 
 
 
create in myriad private relationships. When lawyers help private 
parties or entities make deals, whether for a marriage, an initial 
public offering or a merger and acquisition of an established 
company, they engage in normative ordering—a kind of mini-
constitutionalism. If the Constitution’s framers created a grand 
institutional design in order to keep factions in check, then every time 
lawyers contractually frame a deal, they engage in mini-
constitutionalism. Just as the framers of the Constitution created 
government in order to settle disputes among factions of passion and 
interest, lawyers create contracts to regulate and anticipate disputes 
among individuals and businesses.  
Many lawyers facilitate deals, but many other lawyers provide 
counseling and planning services. Counselors and planners try to 
anticipate future conflict and make sure that their clients are prepared 
in the event of such conflict. Outside the courtroom, many lawyers 
resolve disputes in alternative forms, such as arbitration, mediation, 
and private settlement.  
Even if one accepts that someone in society must do the job of 
normative ordering in order to resolve, anticipate, prevent, and settle 
conflict, one might question why lawyers must be the normative 
orderers. Indeed, plenty of other people also act as normative orderers 
in American society. Parents create normative order in their 
households through a whole series of rules, standards, principles, 
regulations, and precedents. Similarly, spiritual leaders, such as 
priests, rabbis, ministers, and representatives of organized religion in 
other forms, create normative order in society by finding, creating, 
interpreting, applying, and enforcing moral principles with the 
authority of sacred texts.  
Apart from parents and religious leaders, the operation of markets 
also contributes to normative order in society. Many believe that the 
marketplace merely involves the procedural interaction of individuals 
expressing tastes and preferences. In fact, substantive norms also 
emerge out of market practices. For example, if people want to deal 
with others in the future, then they must be honest and trustworthy, 
keep their word, and not renege on deals. Market incentives create 
habits that are a form of normative order.  
If society has parents, priests, and markets creating normative 
order, then why do we need lawyers? In the United States we need 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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lawyers because parents, priests, and markets cannot, by themselves, 
suffice to create normative order. 
Three principal features of American culture support the argument 
for lawyers as the leading source of normative order: (1) democracy, 
(2) diversity, and (3) size. 
A. Democracy 
In the United States people pride themselves on individualism, 
believing that where they come from does not determine where they 
may go. A cultural commitment to social mobility distinguishes the 
United States from troubled regions of the world ranging from 
Belfast to Belgrade. In the United States people believe that they are 
not born into a tribe, caste, religious identity, social status, guild, or 
faction from which they cannot escape, but rather can vote with their 
feet by moving across the country, changing jobs, or starting a 
company. People believe they have the power to exercise fluid social 
choice; the notion of democracy that goes along with this free-
flowing individualism is deeply engrained in American culture. 
When former Vice-President Quayle, quoting Alexis de 
Tocqueville, said disparagingly that there is a legal aristocracy in 
America, his reading of Tocqueville, with all respect, was no more 
accurate than his infamous spelling of “potatoe.”13 When Tocqueville 
wrote about lawyers taking the place of the aristocracy in the United 
States, he did not mean that lawyers were a big bad privileged caste, 
setting themselves above the common people and relying on 
unearned privileges.14 Moreover, Tocqueville did not suggest that 
lawyers are an aristocracy in the sense of a social class with 
privileges above others due to accident of birth.  
To the contrary, Tocqueville’s key insight in Democracy in 
America was that the United States does not have the equivalent of a 
European aristocracy. In his view, the United States’ yeoman 
farmers, early mercantilists and industrialists were not like the 
European craft guilds, dukes, and earls. Rather, the United States is a 
 
 13. Mr. Quayle’s ‘E’ for Effort, N.Y. T IMES, June 17, 1992, at A24. 
 14. ALEXIS DE T OCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. 
Knopf 1976) (1834). 
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democracy, eschewing aristocratic feudal forms of social order. In 
that democracy, said Tocqueville, “[t]he greatest danger was the 
potential tyranny of the majority”15 over the minority. Contrary to 
Vice-President Quayle’s reading, Tocqueville actually said that 
lawyers take the place of an aristocracy not because they are 
aristocratic, but because, like other intermediaries between 
individuals and the state, they help protect people from the danger of 
the tyranny of the majority.16 Lawyers create, Tocqueville said, “[a] 
form of public responsibility and accountability that would help 
preserve the blessings of democracy without allowing its 
untrammeled vices.”17 
This point translates into modern terms. Today, many Americans 
are distrustful of big government, government bureaucracy, and a 
large civil service. Compared with Europeans and citizens of other 
developed nations around the world, Americans are not only more 
mistrustful of centralized government, but also more reluctant to pay 
the high taxes needed to sustain centralized government. That 
explains, in part, why all lawyers, and not just government lawyers, 
have an important role in the United States. Private lawyers take on 
many functions in American society that other societies absorb into 
the kind of centralized government Americans distrust.  
Lawsuits operate as a decentralized form of normative order. If a 
lawyer cannot get a result in one state, then he or she may try to 
obtain the result in a different state. When lawyers bring private 
lawsuits on behalf of states against tobacco manufacturers or cities 
bring lawsuits against gun manufacturers, they pioneer new public 
policy. The reason for this practice is in part the failure of centralized 
strategies. However, it may also be in part an affirmative preference 
for decentralized strategies. By performing an intermediary role 
between individuals and the state in a decentralized fashion, lawyers 
operate, in Tocqueville’s sense, as classic agents of American 
democracy in a geographically and socially fluid society.  
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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B. Diversity 
Diversity, a second important feature of American life, also makes 
lawyers strong candidates for the essential job of normative ordering 
in the United States. Since its very founding, the United States has 
been extraordinarily heterogeneous by world standards—not just with 
respect to religion, but with respect to race, national origin, and, in 
the twentieth century, with respect to opportunities that are open to 
women. Societies that survive with mere social custom creating 
normative order, unlike the United States, are usually homogeneous, 
small, and contained. The United States, by contrast, is sprawlingly 
heterogeneous. Heterogeneity brings more conflict and less 
agreement about social customs, and thus, more necessity for law to 
help mediate across diversity or, as Madison said, factions. By 
creating normative order, lawyers play the role that social custom 
plays in other less diverse societies. 
C. Size 
Large scale, a third feature of American life, likewise points to 
lawyers as the key to conflict settlement. Madison described 
America’s size in The Federalist Papers, Number Ten, as the 
“extend[ed] . . . sphere.”18 The United States is not a village capable 
of having a single custom; it is a vast, expansive territory, in which 
individuals are far flung and corporations and nonprofit organizations 
operate nationally. The United States cannot take a local view 
because it contains a multitude of transactions, among a multitude of 
individuals, who cannot possibly know each other face-to-face like 
small businesspersons know each other on a local main street.  
In a nation of large-scale organizations with large-scale work 
forces and large-scale transactions, lawyers help create economies of 
scale. Lawyers help clients save money on transactions by helping 
them establish procedures and rules that enable clients to accomplish 
the same type of transaction on a repeated basis. When people 
describe lawyers as obstacles who create dead weight, social loss, and 
hold up deals, they miss a key point. Rules and processes that 
 
 18. T HE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) at 64. 
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regularize large-scale organizational activity in the long run enable 
deals and reduce the cost of conflict, contributing not social loss but 
social gain. 
Given the globalization of commerce and law in the contemporary 
world, one must multiply the problem of size presented by the United 
States by several orders of magnitude. Radical advances in 
communication and transportation technologies have reduced costs 
and lowered the barriers to trade and to the flow of capital and labor 
across national borders. Accordingly, everything previously 
mentioned about diversity and size is multiplied. The complexity of 
dealing not only with the multiplicity of individuals across the United 
States, but with the multiplicity of individuals across the world—each 
of whom comes from a different culture, a different market culture, 
and, in many cases, a different spiritual or normative religious 
culture—increases the demand for law and for lawyers to fashion 
workable institutional structures. It is no accident that the demand for 
lawyers increases in parity with the increase in international 
commerce and trade. No supervening sovereign entity and no 
supervening social custom unites everyone around the world. 
Lawyers, engaging in mini-constitutionalism, try to determine 
procedures and structures for interacting peaceably and practically 
across a wide set of differences on a large scale. These functions are 
even more important in the international arena.  
To summarize the argument thus far, lawyers play a vital role in 
the normative ordering of our society that has no clear substitute; our 
size, diversity and democratic traditions ensure that such a role 
cannot be fulfilled by custom, organized religion, or markets alone. 
Why, then, do people barely notice this good that lawyers do? Why 
do people ignore all that lawyers contribute to American life in every 
seat of government, every financial district, every local courthouse, 
and every major city and small town in the nation? Three myths or 
fallacies prevent people from seeing all the good that lawyers do in 
the sense of social product.  
First, the fallacy of the anecdote prevents people from seeing the 
good that lawyers do. For example, newspaper stories about large 
punitive damages awards due to car crashes or scalding cups of 
coffee at McDonald’s are fuel for the explosion of editorials 
criticizing trial lawyers, punitive damages, and seeming windfalls and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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wealth transfers to plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers. These anecdotes 
usually do not mention that the accident might have injured many 
other people besides the plaintiff, that the trial judge or an appeals 
court upon review might have reduced the punitive damages award 
dramatically, or that the lawsuit might have prompted legislative or 
regulatory changes supported by a democratic majority. The colorful 
anecdote inspires negative press by ignoring all of the surrounding 
information. Beware of such negative anecdotes because they often 
are incomplete.  
If there is to be a battle of anecdotes, in any event, good anecdotes 
perhaps can trump the bad. For example, compare the scalding cup of 
coffee anecdote to the anecdote of Thurgood Marshall’s heroic sweep 
through racial segregation, starting with graduate schools and 
working up to Brown v. Board of Education,19 peaceably changing 
society through respect for the rule of law. Other examples of good 
anecdotes include the work of law students and lawyers in clinics 
protecting women and children from violence, restoring wrongfully 
evicted tenants to their homes, and preventing the location of unsafe 
industrial plants in residential neighborhoods. Lawyers have the 
power to correct negative and incomplete anecdotes, by supplanting 
them with anecdotes of good. 
Second, and more insidious than the fallacy of the anecdote, the 
fallacy of myopia or nearsightedness prevents people from seeing all 
the good that lawyers do. While the fallacy of the anecdote involves 
clearly visible activities, lawyers’ best work is largely invisible to the 
naked eye because lawyers tend to anticipate and avert press-
attracting conflict. A focus solely on visible conflicts ignores all the 
invisible conflict anticipation and prevention that lawyers do. 
Lawyers anticipate, prevent, and provide for potential negative 
fallout. Someone who wants to start a company, for example, may 
only think optimistically about how to produce and market, while her 
lawyer wonders about the possible consequences of the company 
going belly-up for the investors, creditors, neighbors, surrounding 
community, and the environment. The lawyer’s attention to private 
liability and debt thus in effect attends to the public good. This work 
 
 19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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often is most invisible when it is most successful. If the lawyer is 
successful, then the conflict or calamity never arises and the press has 
nothing to report.  
Again, Tocqueville anticipated this phenomenon, describing the 
role of lawyers as often under the surface and not visible, but vital 
nonetheless. He said that “[w]hen the American people is intoxicated 
by passion and carried away by the impetuosity of its ideas, it is 
checked and stopped by the almost invisible influence of its legal 
counselors.”20 Tocqueville’s comments on public life apply with 
equal force to private ventures. In short, if somebody suddenly 
eliminated lawyers from the world in one fell swoop, conflict and 
calamity would arise and somebody will have to pick up the pieces. 
Only then would the invisible, preventive, and vital work of lawyers 
be visible. 
Third, the myth of private ordering prevents people from giving 
lawyers adequate credit for the good they do. People often say that 
issues should be removed from the legal system, deregulated, and put 
into private hands. This argument, however, forgets the lessons 
Americans have learned since the New Deal, as first articulated by 
the great writings of the legal realists. Since the New Deal, the notion 
of a pure or natural private order has been understood as a myth. 
Private relationships exist peaceably only because of law. The law 
prevents the operation of force or fraud and dictates that neighbor A 
can not build a pool in neighbor B’s backyard. If neighbor A does 
build the pool, then law dictates that neighbor B cannot punch him. 
One might argue that neighbor B could bribe neighbor A not to put a 
pool in his backyard, and that, thus, the law is unnecessary. But even 
if that were true, the situation is more complicated when one deals on 
a larger scale with a smokestack that belches smoke or a strip mine 
that causes muck to run down a stream, imperiling many people’s 
property. 
Negotiation over every danger that could befall us is not always 
possible, and thus the law steps in to regulate private relationships. 
Law protects property and persons from harm from other people. 
Once the notion of pure private order is exposed as myth, the 
 
 20. T OCQUEVILLE, supra  note 14. 
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question becomes not whether law should operate but rather how law 
should operate—by regulation or private contract, by national or local 
policy, by courtroom resolution or mediation. 
In sum, lawyers create enormous social good in ways that have no 
obvious substitute in a society as large, diverse, and democratic as 
American society. If the United States did not have lawyers, it would 
have to invent them. This realization, by itself, should help you 
respond to taxi drivers and relatives who might tease you about being 
lawyers.  
II. GOOD AS SOCIAL VIRTUE 
The good as social virtue refers to the Aristotelian or Kantian 
sense of good, rather than the good in the sense of social product or 
utility. This sense of the good is reflected in the venerable view that 
law is a profession, not a business. The lawyer’s license implies that 
the lawyer is meant to serve the good of the broader community, and 
not just the lawyer’s, or the lawyer’s clients’, private self-interest. 
This image of lawyers as a profession with a conception of the 
good is currently under pressure from market forces that have 
increased competition among law firms, changed firms’ fee structure, 
and led to a great deal of mobility among firms where people used to 
stay for life. This image of lawyers is also under pressure from 
technological change that has increased the speed of business, now 
done by fax machines, e-mail, and cell phones. Lawyers are only a 
beeper away from their clients at all times. How can lawyers remain 
separate from business when they must be available twenty-four 
hours a day in order to keep up with the pace of deals? Likewise, 
external competition from accounting firms and other ventures also 
places pressure upon the notion of law as a profession distinct from 
business.  
Notwithstanding pressure from clients, new technologies, and 
competitors, the death of professionalism in law has been greatly 
exaggerated. This is not because those attracted to law have unusual 
reservoirs of personal human kindness or benevolence. Rather, three 
structural features of lawyers’ work ensure that lawyers attend to the 
common good, quite apart from any features of their souls. 
First, law mediates between broad principles and specific 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/3
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situations. This process distinguishes lawyers from economists, 
historians, and psychologists, as well as from pure troubleshooters. 
By mediating between broad principles and specific situations—
ratcheting back and forth to reach a reflective equilibrium between 
justice, fairness, equality, allocative efficiency, and the particular 
conflict at hand—lawyers think not only about the result in a 
particular case, but also about the public trail they leave behind for 
resolution of future situations. When lawyers ratchet back and forth 
between broad principles and specific situations, they necessarily 
have one eye on the common good and the interests of society that 
transcend a particular situation.  
A second structural feature of a lawyer’s work that ensures 
advertence to the common good is that law is a distinctive social 
practice, not a mere matter of individual market taste or political 
ideology. To be sure, law is not autonomous from other disciplines. 
To the contrary, lawyers are magpies, or birds that pick up things 
from other disciplines and bring them back to their nest. Lawyers 
take the insights of other disciplines—economics, literature, history, 
psychology, cultural theory, finance theory, and statistics—and bring 
them back to the legal arena. Even though law is not intellectually 
autonomous, it is nonetheless a social practice that is distinct from 
pure politics and that has its own structure and rhetoric that enable it 
to operate independent of short-term political struggle. The following 
story illustrates this point. 
Imagine that you are a welfare recipient and a mother without a 
job with three children to support. You want to move across state 
lines. When you get to the new state, however, the state says: “I am 
sorry. You cannot have welfare here until you have lived here for a 
year.” What are you going to do? You might not travel across state 
lines, because once there you will not be able to feed your children if 
you are unable to find a job. Twenty-five years ago, in Shapiro v. 
Thompson,21 the Supreme Court invalidated a state law containing a 
similar one-year residency requirement for welfare. In Shapiro, 
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that durational residency 
requirements interfere with the fundamental right to interstate 
 
 21. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).  
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travel.22 Justice Brennan, sounding in the 1970s rhetoric of welfare 
rights and equality, said in Shapiro that nobody should be denied the 
basic necessities of life for having moved on the other side of a state 
line. 
Twenty-five years later, this issue returned to the Court in a 
slightly different form. A series of states, with the blessing of 
Congress, said “we will give you welfare when you move to our 
state, but when you become a new resident you can only get as much 
welfare as you got in your previous state.” In other words, if a person 
comes from Mississippi and only received $370 in Mississippi, then 
for the person’s first year in California she will only receive $370 
even though long-time Californians receive $750. A class of indigent 
women sought to travel to California and take advantage of full 
Californian welfare benefits. When I became involved in this 
litigation, along with a team of lawyers from both legal services 
organizations and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
Southern California, we asked what we could do to defend this class, 
given the huge paradigm shifts since the late 1970s and the huge loss 
of public support for welfare. It did not seem likely that the current 
Supreme Court would adopt Justice Brennan’s majestic phrasing 
about the necessities of life. We determined that the current Court 
does care deeply, however, about a different federal constitutional 
principle that could be made to serve these clients: specifically, the 
structure of federalism and the importance of national citizenship in 
our structure of federalism. Accordingly, we argued that, ever since 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause overruled Dred 
Scott23 and ended slavery, states may no longer maintain two classes 
of citizens.24 In other words, one is not a new Californian or an old 
Californian, but rather simply a Californian. We argued that 
California could decide whether national citizens who entered its 
borders truly resided in California or whether they were faking 
residence, but otherwise must treat all bona fide state residents alike.  
In a 1999 decision Saenz v. Roe,25 our argument finally 
 
 22. Id. at 630-31. 
 23. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 24. 394 U.S. at 627. 
 25. 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999). 
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prevailed,26 as the Court ruled, seven to two, that two-tier welfare 
residency schemes violate the Citizenship clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As a result, we took a class of people who were unlikely 
to prevail under the old paradigm about the necessities of life, and 
persuaded the Supreme Court that they should prevail under the 
structural paradigm of federalism. The power of argument, ideas, and 
ideals that transcended a political paradigm shift enabled this 
surprising victory. This story conveys that law is a distinctive social 
practice, not reducible to ordinary politics.  
Finally, a third structural feature of a lawyer’s work that ensures 
advertence to the common good is that lawyers care a great deal 
about professional autonomy, and with that autonomy comes 
distributive obligations. Lawyers are self-regulated. They are not 
subject to legislation in the same way as the butcher, the baker, or the 
candlestick maker. The price of professional autonomy and self-
regulation is some duty of service. In recent years, bar associations, 
under pressure in some instances from courts, have rolled back 
professional practice regulations that inhibit competition, ban 
unauthorized legal practice, and prevent lawyer advertising. Such 
changes have appropriately allowed more competition in the 
profession, and increased allocative efficiency.  
Nonetheless, lawyers’ distributive obligations in reciprocity for 
professional autonomy should not be thrown out with the bath water 
of eliminating those restrictions on practice that decrease allocative 
inefficiency. Lawyers have preserved a large piece of professional 
autonomy by professing to ensure equal access to justice. This 
obligation is chiseled in marble above the nine seats and the crimson 
curtains of the United States Supreme Court. The norms lawyers 
adopt recite the obligation of equal access to justice. For example, the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that lawyers should do at 
least fifty hours of unpaid work every year.27  
Providing increased access to justice thus is not merely a matter of 
personal beneficence, goodness, and virtue, but also a matter of 
professional independence. Lawyers will be relatively free of 
 
 26. The author argued a precursor case, Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995) (per 
curiam). 
 27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1999). 
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government regulation only as long as they take care to justify 
regulatory privileges, including seeking to foster equal justice under 
law. Lawyers on average are far behind that mere fifty hours a year, 
although some lawyers are exemplary and do far more. Doing far 
more would contribute not only to personal satisfaction, but also to 
the independence of the legal profession. 
Let me close by wishing you the best in your careers, and hoping 
that you will go out and do well, but also do good, in both its senses.
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